Roger Myerson (né le 29 mars 1951 à Boston) est un économiste américain ayant travaillé sur la théorie des jeux, et plus particulièrment sur la théorie des mécanismes d'incitation. En 2007, il a partagé le « prix Nobel » d'économie avec Leonid Hurwicz et Eric Maskin.
Myerson a fait toute ses études à Harvard, où il a obtenu un doctorat en 1976 pour son travail sur les jeux coopératifs. Il a enseigné à la Northwestern University de 1976 à 2001, puis à l'université de Chicago à partir de 2001.
Publications
Articles
Liste partielle :
"Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research 2 (1977), 225–229.
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica 45 (1977), 1631–1637.
"Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," International Journal of Game Theory 7 (1978), 73–80.
"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 47 (1979), 61–73.
"Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981), 58–73.
"Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica 51 (1983), 1767–1797.
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 52 (1984), 461–487.
"Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Social Goals and Social Organization, édition L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, et Hugo Sonnenschein, Cambridge University Press (1985), 229–259.
"Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance," Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:1 (1995), 77–89.
"Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46–65.
"Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems," European Economic Review 43 (1999), 671–697.
Livres
Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1991.
Probability Models for Economic Decisions, Duxbury Press, 2005.